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ד

Paršat Cav
15. adar II 5768
začátek šabatu: 17:59
konec šabatu: 19:06
Šušan purim

třilin 4:53 | východ slunce 5:59 | šma 8:02 | první mincha 12:39 | škia 18:18 | hvězdy 18:50



Cav v číslech

25. paraša v Tóře (z 54) a 2. v knize Vajikra (z 10) obsahuje 8 „paršiot“, 7 otevřených, 1 zavřenou skládá se z 97 vět, 1353 slov a 5096 písmen obsahuje 18 micvot, 9 příkazů a 9 zákazů

Zajímavost týdne

Tento šabat připadá na 15. adar, neboli **Šušan purim**. K pochopení tohoto pojmu je třeba si uvědomit, že vlastní půtky s Hamanovými stoupenci proběhly 13. adaru, takže 14. adaru se již po celé Persii slavilo (= Purim). Jen v Šušanu, v hlavním městě říše žilo Hamanových stoupenců více, takže se Židům vedeným Mordachajem nepodařilo všechny pochytat během jednoho dne a oslavy vypukly až o den později (15. adar = Šušan purim).

Když pak Mordechaj a Ester sepisovali příkazy o pravidelných oslavách, nařídili slavit purim v městech s hradbami až 15. adaru. Ale protože v té době byla všechna izraelská města v ruinách, přišli rabíni s nápadem považovat za *město s hradbami* takové město, které mělo hradby v době Jehošuy bin Nuna. Kromě vlastního Šušanu byl takovým městem jistě ještě Jeruzalém, kde se dodnes slaví purim 15. adaru.

V Jeruzalémě tak občas dochází k tzv. Trojitému purimu (PURIM HAMEŠULAŠ), kdy se Megila čte v pátek, AL HANISIM a KRIAT TORA na šabat a hostina a MIŠLOACH MANOT proběhnou v neděli.

Kromě Jeruzaléma se Megila čte 15. adaru ještě i v Jafo, Akku, Cfatu, Tverii a Chevron, v těchto městech jde ale pouze o zvyk, protože není jasné, zda měly v klíčovou dobu skutečně hradby.

Alijot v kostce

Kohen: První z každodenních chrámových činností – TRUMAT HADEŠEN – vybírání popela z žároviště. Příkazy o moučné oběti MINCHA.

Levi: Pravidelná oběť velekněze. Příkazy o oběti za hřích CHATAT.

Šliši: Detaily příkazů o obětech ŠLAMIM. Zákaz konzumovat NOTAR (obětní zbytky po stanovené lhůtě ke konzumci) a PIGUL (nezpůsobitelná oběť). Které porce je potřeba spálit na oltáři.

Revií: Zasvěcení Aharona a jeho synů do kohenské služby.

Chamiši: Oběti obětované při inauguraci Aharona a jeho synů.

Šiši: Pokračování v zasvěcení Aharona a jeho synů – EYL HAMILUIM.

Švií: Pomazání Aharona, jeho synů a jejich kněžských šatů.

Haftara (Jirmejahu 7:23-8:3 a 9:22-23): Boží hněv na ty, kdo přivádějí oběti, ale nemění své hříšné chování.

Vyzkoušejte se

Klíčové pojmy z této paraši jsou začarovány do obrázků.

Vaším úkolem je rozkrýt jednotlivá slova.



Dvar Tora

AL MOKDA AL HAMIZBEACH KOL HALAJLA...

Kli Yakar si všiml, že zatímco OLA (celooběť) očišťující od nečistých myšlenek, byla na oltáři pálena po celou noc, protože nečisté myšlenky napadají člověka i v noci, tak CHATAT (oběť za hřích) bylo nutné spálit ještě za denního světla, kdy je páchána většina hříchů. Na druhou stranu ale, aby se napravení hříšníci nestyděli obětovat a měli možnost tvrdit, že oběťují OLA, bylo místo porážky obou obětí stejné.

Rav Sacks: Covenant and Conversation

JUDAISM IS LESS A PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM than a field of tensions – between universalism and particularism, for example, or exile and redemption, priests and prophets, cyclical and linear time and so on. Rarely is this more in evidence than in the conflicting statements within Judaism about sacrifices, and nowhere more sharply than in the juxtaposition between the sedra of Tzav, which contains a series of commands about sacrifice, and the passage from the book of Jeremiah that is usually (not this year) its haftarah:

When I brought your forefathers out of Egypt and spoke to them, I did not give them commands about burnt offerings and sacrifices, but I gave them this command: "Obey me, and I will be your G-d and you will be My people. Walk in all the ways I command you, that it may go well with you." (Jer. 7: 22-23)

Commentators have been puzzled by the glaring contradiction between these words and the obvious fact that G-d did command the Israelites about sacrifices after bringing them out of Egypt. Several solutions have been offered. According to Maimonides, the sacrifices were a means, not an end, to the service of G-d. Radak argues that sacrifices were not the first of G-d's commands after the exodus; instead, civil laws were. Abarbanel goes so far as to say that initially G-d had not intended to give the Israelites a code of sacrifice, and did so only after the sin of the Golden Calf. The sacrifices were an antidote to the Israelites' tendency to rebel against G-d.

The simplest explanation is to note that the Hebrew word LO does not invariably mean "not"; sometimes it means "not only" or "not just". According to this, Jeremiah is not saying that G-d did not command sacrifices. He did, but they were not the sole or even most important element of the religious life. The common denominator of the prophetic critique of sacrifices is not opposition to them as such, but rather an insistence that acts directed to G-d must never dull our sense of duty to mankind. Micah gave this idea one of its most famous expressions:

With what shall I come before the Lord And bow down before the exalted G-d? Will the Lord be pleased with thousands of rams, With ten thousand rivers of oil? He has shown you, O man, what is good. What does the Lord require of you? To act justly and to love mercy, And to walk humbly with your G-d.

To be sure, sacrifices have not been part of the life of Judaism since the destruction of the Second Temple, almost 2,000 years ago. But why, if they are a means to an end, did G-d choose this end? This is, of course, one of the deepest questions in Judaism, and there are many answers. Here I want explore just one, first given by the

early fifteenth century Jewish thinker, R. Joseph Albo, in his Sefer ha-Ikkarim.

Albo's theory took as its starting point, not sacrifices but two other intriguing questions. The first: Why, after the flood, did G-d permit human beings to eat meat? (Gen. 9: 3-5). Initially, neither human beings nor animals had been meat-eaters (Gen. 1: 29-30). What caused G-d, as it were, to change His mind? The second: What was wrong with the first act of sacrifice, Cain's offering of "some of the fruits of the soil" (Gen. 4:3-5). G-d's rejection of that offering led directly to the first murder, when Cain killed Abel. What was at stake in the difference between Cain and Abel as to how to bring a gift to G-d?

Albo's theory is this. Killing animals for food is inherently wrong. It involves taking the life of a sentient being to satisfy our needs. Cain knew this. He believed there was a strong kinship between man and the animals. That is why he offered, not an animal sacrifice, but a vegetable one (his error, according to Albo, is that he should have brought fruit, not vegetables – the highest, not the lowest, of non-meat produce). Abel, by contrast, believed that there was a qualitative difference between man and the animals. That is why he brought an animal sacrifice. Once Cain saw that Abel's sacrifice had been accepted while his own was not, he reasoned thus. If G-d (who forbids us to kill animals for food) permits and even favours killing an animal as a sacrifice, and if (as Cain believed) there is no ultimate difference between human beings and animals, then I shall offer the very highest living being as a sacrifice to G-d, namely my brother Abel. Cain killed Abel not out of envy or animosity but as a human sacrifice.

That is why G-d permitted meat-eating after the flood. Before the flood, the world had been "filled with violence". Perhaps violence is an inherent part of human nature. If there were to be a humanity at all, G-d would have to lower his demands of mankind. Let them kill animals, He said, rather than kill human beings – the one form of life that is not only G-d's creation but also G-d's image.

The permission to kill animals is accompanied by an absolute prohibition against killing human beings ("for in the image of G-d, has G-d made man"). It is not that G-d approves of killing animals, whether for sacrifice or food, but that to forbid this to human beings, given their genetic predisposition to violence, is utopian. It is not for now but for the end of days. In the meanwhile, the least bad solution is to let people kill animals rather than murder their fellow humans. Animal sacrifices are a concession to human nature. Sacrifices are a substitute for violence directed against mankind.